Last data update: May 13, 2024. (Total: 46773 publications since 2009)
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Protecting infants from RSV: Understanding guidance on new prevention tools
Hepworth Susan , Hopkins Bob , Jones Jefferson , Crowley Karen . Neonatology Today 2023 18 (12) 12-20 The article focuses on a webinar titled "Protecting Infants from RSV: Understanding Guidance on New Prevention Tools," hosted by the National Coalition for Infant Health, with speakers from the Association of Women's Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses, CDC, and the National Foundation for Infectious Diseases. |
Use of U.S. Blood Donors for National Serosurveillance of SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies: Basis for an Expanded National Donor Serosurveillance Program.
Stone M , Di Germanio C , Wright DJ , Sulaeman H , Dave H , Fink RV , Notari EP , Green V , Strauss D , Kessler D , Destree M , Saa P , Williamson PC , Simmons G , Stramer SL , Opsomer J , Jones JM , Kleinman S , Busch MP . Clin Infect Dis 2021 74 (5) 871-881 INTRODUCTION: The REDS-IV-P Epidemiology, Surveillance and Preparedness of the Novel SARS-CoV-2 Epidemic (RESPONSE) seroprevalence study conducted monthly cross-sectional testing for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies on blood donors in six U.S. metropolitan regions to estimate the extent of SARS-COV-2 infections over time. STUDY DESIGN/METHODS: During March-August 2020, approximately ≥1,000 serum specimens were collected monthly from each region and tested for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies using a well-validated algorithm. Regional seroprevalence estimates were weighted based on demographic differences with the general population. Seroprevalence was compared with reported COVID-19 case rates over time. RESULTS/FINDINGS: For all regions, seroprevalence was <1.0% in March 2020. New York experienced the biggest increase (peak seroprevalence, 15.8 % in May). All other regions experienced modest increases in seroprevalence(1-2% in May-June to 2-4% in July-August). Seroprevalence was higher in younger, non-Hispanic Black, and Hispanic donors. Temporal increases in donor seroprevalence correlated with reported case rates in each region. In August, 1.3-5.6 estimated cumulative infections (based on seroprevalence data) per COVID-19 case reported to CDC. CONCLUSION: Increases in seroprevalence were found in all regions, with the largest increase in New York. Seroprevalence was higher in non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic blood donors than in non-Hispanic White blood donors. SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing of blood donor samples can be used to estimate the seroprevalence in the general population by region and demographic group. The methods derived from the RESPONSE seroprevalence study served as the basis for expanding SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence surveillance to all 50 states and Puerto Rico. |
SARS-CoV-2 Infections among Recent Organ Recipients, March-May 2020, United States.
Jones JM , Kracalik I , Rana MM , Nguyen A , Keller BC , Mishkin A , Hoopes C , Kaleekal T , Humar A , Vilaro J , Im G , Smith L , Justice A , Leaumont C , Lindstrom S , Whitaker B , La Hoz RM , Michaels MG , Klassen D , Kuhnert W , Basavaraju SV . Emerg Infect Dis 2021 27 (2) 552-555 We conducted public health investigations of 8 organ transplant recipients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection. Findings suggest the most likely source of transmission was community or healthcare exposure, not the organ donor. Transplant centers should educate transplant candidates and recipients about infection prevention recommendations. |
Assessing Solid Organ Donors and Monitoring Transplant Recipients for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus, and Hepatitis C Virus Infection - U.S. Public Health Service Guideline, 2020.
Jones JM , Kracalik I , Levi ME , Bowman JS3rd , Berger JJ , Bixler D , Buchacz K , Moorman A , Brooks JT , Basavaraju SV . MMWR Recomm Rep 2020 69 (4) 1-16 The recommendations in this report supersede the U.S Public Health Service (PHS) guideline recommendations for reducing transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) through organ transplantation (Seem DL, Lee I, Umscheid CA, Kuehnert MJ. PHS guideline for reducing human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis B virus, and hepatitis C virus transmission through organ transplantation. Public Health Rep 2013;128:247-343), hereafter referred to as the 2013 PHS guideline. PHS evaluated and revised the 2013 PHS guideline because of several advances in solid organ transplantation, including universal implementation of nucleic acid testing of solid organ donors for HIV, HBV, and HCV; improved understanding of risk factors for undetected organ donor infection with these viruses; and the availability of highly effective treatments for infection with these viruses. PHS solicited feedback from its relevant agencies, subject-matter experts, additional stakeholders, and the public to develop revised guideline recommendations for identification of risk factors for these infections among solid organ donors, implementation of laboratory screening of solid organ donors, and monitoring of solid organ transplant recipients. Recommendations that have changed since the 2013 PHS guideline include updated criteria for identifying donors at risk for undetected donor HIV, HBV, or HCV infection; the removal of any specific term to characterize donors with HIV, HBV, or HCV infection risk factors; universal organ donor HIV, HBV, and HCV nucleic acid testing; and universal posttransplant monitoring of transplant recipients for HIV, HBV, and HCV infections. The recommendations are to be used by organ procurement organization and transplant programs and are intended to apply only to solid organ donors and recipients and not to donors or recipients of other medical products of human origin (e.g., blood products, tissues, corneas, and breast milk). The recommendations pertain to transplantation of solid organs procured from donors without laboratory evidence of HIV, HBV, or HCV infection. Additional considerations when transplanting solid organs procured from donors with laboratory evidence of HCV infection are included but are not required to be incorporated into Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network policy. Transplant centers that transplant organs from HCV-positive donors should develop protocols for obtaining informed consent, testing and treating recipients for HCV, ensuring reimbursement, and reporting new infections to public health authorities. |
Tuberculosis transmission across three states: the story of a solid organ donor born in an endemic country, 2018.
Jones JM , Vikram HR , Lauzardo M , Hill A , Jones J , Haley C , Seaworth B , Oldham S , Brown M , Gutierrez F , Basavaraju SV . Transpl Infect Dis 2020 22 (6) e13357 Transmission of tuberculosis (TB) from a deceased solid organ donor to recipients can result in severe morbidity and mortality. In 2018, four solid organ transplant recipients residing in three states but sharing a common organ donor were diagnosed with TB disease. Two recipients were hospitalized and none died. The organ donor was born in a country with a high incidence of TB and experienced 8 weeks of headache and fever prior to death, but was not tested for TB during multiple hospitalizations or prior to organ procurement. TB isolates of two organ recipients and a close contact of the donor had identical TB genotypes and closely related whole-genome sequencing results. Donors with risk factors for TB, in particular birth or residence in countries with a higher TB incidence, should be carefully evaluated for TB. |
Sepsis Attributed to Bacterial Contamination of Platelets Associated with a Potential Common Source - Multiple States, 2018.
Jones SA , Jones JM , Leung V , Nakashima AK , Oakeson KF , Smith AR , Hunter R , Kim JJ , Cumming M , McHale E , Young PP , Fridey JL , Kelley WE , Stramer SL , Wagner SJ , West FB , Herron R , Snyder E , Hendrickson JE , Peaper DR , Gundlapalli AV , Langelier C , Miller S , Nambiar A , Moayeri M , Kamm J , Moulton-Meissner H , Annambhotla P , Gable P , McAllister GA , Breaker E , Sula E , Halpin AL , Basavaraju SV . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2019 68 (23) 519-523 During May-October 2018, four patients from three states experienced sepsis after transfusion of apheresis platelets contaminated with Acinetobacter calcoaceticus-baumannii complex (ACBC) and Staphylococcus saprophyticus; one patient died. ACBC isolates from patients' blood, transfused platelet residuals, and two environmental samples were closely related by whole genome sequencing. S. saprophyticus isolates from two patients' blood, three transfused platelet residuals, and one hospital environmental sample formed two whole genome sequencing clusters. This whole genome sequencing analysis indicated a potential common source of bacterial contamination; investigation into the contamination source continues. All platelet donations were collected using apheresis cell separator machines and collection sets from the same manufacturer; two of three collection sets were from the same lot. One implicated platelet unit had been treated with pathogen-inactivation technology, and two had tested negative with a rapid bacterial detection device after negative primary culture. Because platelets are usually stored at room temperature, bacteria in contaminated platelet units can proliferate to clinically relevant levels by the time of transfusion. Clinicians should monitor for sepsis after platelet transfusions even after implementation of bacterial contamination mitigation strategies. Recognizing adverse transfusion reactions and reporting to the platelet supplier and hemovigilance systems is crucial for public health practitioners to detect and prevent sepsis associated with contaminated platelets. |
Quantifying the risk of undetected HIV, hepatitis B virus, or hepatitis C virus infection in Public Health Service increased risk donors.
Jones JM , Gurbaxani BM , Asher A , Sansom S , Annambhotla P , Moorman AC , Brooks JT , Basavaraju SV . Am J Transplant 2019 19 (9) 2583-2593 To reduce the risk of HIV, hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission through organ transplantation, donors are universally screened for these infections by nucleic acid tests (NAT). Deceased organ donors are classified as "increased risk" if they engaged in specific behaviors during the 12 months before death. We developed a model to estimate the risk of undetected infection for HIV, HBV, and HCV among NAT-negative donors specific to the type and timing of donors' potential risk behavior to guide revisions to the 12-month timeline. Model parameters were estimated, including risk of disease acquisition for increased-risk groups, number of virions that multiply to establish infection, virus doubling time, and limit of detection by NAT. Monte Carlo simulation was performed. The risk of undetected infection was <1/1,000,000 for HIV after 14 days, for HBV after 35 days, and for HCV after 7 days from the time of most recent potential exposure to the day of a negative NAT. The period during which reported donor risk behaviors result in an "increased risk" designation can be safely shortened. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. |
Fatal Sepsis Associated with Bacterial Contamination of Platelets - Utah and California, August 2017.
Horth RZ , Jones JM , Kim JJ , Lopansri BK , Ilstrup SJ , Fridey J , Kelley WE , Stramer SL , Nambiar A , Ramirez-Avila L , Nichols A , Garcia W , Oakeson KF , Vlachos N , McAllister G , Hunter R , Nakashima AK , Basavaraju SV . MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2018 67 (25) 718-722 During August 2017, two separate clusters of platelet transfusion-associated bacterial sepsis were reported in Utah and California. In Utah, two patients died after platelet transfusions from the same donation. Clostridium perfringens isolates from one patient's blood, the other patient's platelet bag, and donor skin swabs were highly related by whole genome sequencing (WGS). In California, one patient died after platelet transfusion; Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates from the patient's blood and platelet bag residuals and a nontransfused platelet unit were matched using WGS. Investigation revealed no deviations in blood supplier or hospital procedures. Findings in this report highlight that even when following current procedures, the risk for transfusion-related infection and fatality persists, making additional interventions necessary. Clinicians need to be vigilant in monitoring for platelet-transmitted bacterial infections and report adverse reactions to blood suppliers and hemovigilance systems. Blood suppliers and hospitals could consider additional evidence-based bacterial contamination risk mitigation strategies, including pathogen inactivation, rapid detection devices, and modified screening of bacterial culture protocols. |
Tick-Borne Relapsing Fever Outbreak Among a High School Football Team at an Outdoor Education Camping Trip, Arizona, 2014.
Jones JM , Hranac CR , Schumacher M , Horn K , Lee DM , Terriquez J , Engelthaler DM , Peoples M , Corrigan J , Replogle A , Souders N , Komatsu KK , Nieto NC . Am J Trop Med Hyg 2016 95 (3) 546-50 During August 2014, five high school students who had attended an outdoor education camp were hospitalized with a febrile illness, prompting further investigation. Ten total cases of tick-borne relapsing fever (TBRF) were identified-six cases confirmed by culture or visualization of spirochetes on blood smear and four probable cases with compatible symptoms (attack rate: 23%). All patients had slept in the campsite's only cabin. Before the camp, a professional pest control company had rodent proofed the cabin, but no acaricides had been applied. Cabin inspection after the camp found rodents and Ornithodoros ticks, the vector of TBRF. Blood samples from a chipmunk trapped near the cabin and from patients contained Borrelia hermsii with identical gene sequences (100% over 630 base pairs). Health departments in TBRF endemic areas should consider educating cabin owners and pest control companies to apply acaricides during or following rodent proofing, because ticks that lack rodents for a blood meal might feed on humans. |
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